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I. INTRODUCTION
Bureaucracy does not exist in a vacuum, instead political,
social and economic elements of the environment serve to shape
governmental bureaucracy. Since this study deals with the
Saudi bureaucracy, it is appropriate to provide a brief over¬
view of the political, economic and social setting of Saudi
Arabia.
Political Setting;
Unlike most third world countries (including other Arab
countries) which are characterized by post-colonial military
republic systems, Saudi Arabia's political system has been a
monarchial one since 1932. An era of domestic conflicts ended
in the unification of the country under the rule of Ibn Saud.
Discussion of significant features provides a general
picture of polity in Saudi Arabia.
First, while the legal bases in the West are generally
clear-cut, supreme law constitutions, the legal base for the
political authority in Saudi Arabia is derived from the Islamic
law or A1 Shariah as interpreted by the conservative Sunna
ideology. The Islamic law in this context is, as Alawaji put
it:
A socio-legal framework. It is concerned with
all activities of the individuals and the govern¬
ment, from the most private to the most public,
that is, from questions relating to definition
1
2
of higher public authority to detailed laws regu¬
lating marriage and divorce. Such an unlimited
scope of A1 Shariah, plus its sacred status are
the basic factors in the claim of its constitu¬
tional function.1
Although the Islamic law (within the conservative view¬
point) includes the "Al Shura" principle which implies consul¬
tation and political representation, it is up to the ruler
either to grant such principles or to maintain his unilateral
political authority. This stems from the Sunna belief in re¬
garding submission to the ruler a priority as long as the latter
maintains the religious legal system.
Second, although there is no written constitution, the
Shariah is considered as the source of legitimacy. Besides,
the political leadership enjoys the support of three primary
forces: (1) the religious group (Ulama) who have a powerful
impact on the people; (2) the elites, consisting of the royal
family who own considerable shares in the private sector econ¬
omy, and wealthy merchant families whose number has risen no-
2
ticeably since the 1970s; and (3) tribal chiefs whose influence
is less in comparison with the previous two groups, but are
still of some importance. These chiefs receive special grants
from the government and the royal family.^
^Ibrahim M. Alawaji, "Bureaucracy and Society in Saudi
Arabia" (Ph.D. dissertation. University of Virginia, 1971),
pp. 104-105.
2
Enver M. Koury, The Saudi Decision-Making Body (Hyatts-
ville, Maryland: Institute of Middle East and North African
Affairs, 1978), p. 27
^Ibid., p. 27.
3
Third, principles such as separation of powers or checks
and balances do not apply to the Saudi political setting.
The king is both head of State and the Prime Minister. In
addition to exercising legislative power, he exercises executive
power through the Council of Ministers, and oversees the judi¬
cial function through the Council of the Senior Ulama.4
Economic Setting;
Saudi Arabia's modern economic history began, virtually,
with the discovery of oil in 1938. The area, so lacking in
water, was blessed with large reserves of crude oil and natural
gas. By 1984, more than one quarter of the world's known crude
oil reserves belonged to Saudi Arabia. However, it was not un¬
til the 1970s that the country became one of the major producers
and the largest exporter of oil. Oil revenues increased slowly
in the 1950s and 1960s, hence causing sluggish economic develop¬
ment. The government oil revenues rose dramatically, however,
since 1973 to the present time. In its role as a major oil
producer, the country actively participated in setting oil
prices through the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
{OPEC).
Beginning in 1970, the government set forth its first 5-
year development plan; the first official detailed and compre¬
hensive document of government policies. Among the major goals
of this plan were: (1) increasing the level of the National
4 Ibid., p. 46.
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Domestic Product, (2) developing the country's human resources,
and (3) diversifying sources of national income by reducing
dependence on oil as the major source of national income.
The Second Development Plan (1975-1980) and the Third De¬
velopment Plan (1980-1985) promulgated the same goals, with em¬
phasis, however, on building physical infra-structures such
as roads, hospitals, schools, housing, etc. In addition, both
plans emphasized increasing industrial and agricultural produc¬
tion.^ The second plan called for the spending of about $142
billion; ten times that of the first development plan (the
actual spending was $202 billion). The third development plan,
however, was more modest due, in part, to the stabilization of
oil revenues and the desire to decrease inflation and avoid
7
absorptive capacity problems which will be illustrated shortly.
While financial constraints were no longer an obstacle,
others replaced them. One obstacle was an ever-increasing
O
debase. High commissions given in governmental contracts are a
prime example of such debase. Limited absorptive capacity of
the economy is yet another barrier. Particularly troublesome
5
Suliman Almazroa, "Public Administration Trends and Pros¬
pects In The Development of Saudi Arabia" (Ph. D. dissertation,
Clearmont Graduate School, 1980), p. 180.
^Ibid., p. 186.
7
Richard Nyrop, Saudi Arabia; A Country Study (Washington,
D.C.: The American University, 1984), p. 169.
O
Peter Hobday, Saudi Arabia Today (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1978), p. 81.
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were inadequate port facilities and transportation systems com-
g
bined with a severe shortage of manpower and technical skills.
Social Setting;
Even though the Saudi society shares some essential charac¬
teristics, such as the Islamic religion, the Arabic languages,
and other basic cultural traits, this society has, however,
other differentiating features reflected in two major types of
social structure; the homogeneous/semi-homogeneous type, and
the heterogeneous type.^^
The homogeneous/semi-homogeneous type exists predominantly
in the tribal and the village communities. The tribal system is
characterized by tribal structural patterns such as kinship and
lineage. This results in tribe members sharing communal values
such as mutual obligation and interdependence.
The village communities maintain their tribal and (or) ex¬
tended family relationships and values, yet villages are under¬
going noticeable changes due to the incoming immigration of
foreign labor and the outgoing migration of many villagers to
large cities. The second type included the holy cities of Mec-
cah and Medina whose historic religious significance to Muslims
around the world exposed them to Muslim migration. Still other
large cities took heterogeneous features more recently following
^ Nyrop, Saudi Arabia; A Country Study, pp. 169-170.
^^lawaji, "Bureaucracy and Society in Saudi Arabia," p. 60.
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the discovery of oil, the expansion of government activities,
11
and the development of the private economy.
Beyond these two types of social classifications, the Saudi
society has been regarded as having a small upper-class, a lar¬
ger, but still relatively small middle-class, and a significant
lower middle-class and lower-class. However, following the ex¬
treme economic wealth after the oil embargo of 1973 and the
rising oil prices of 1974 and 1975, the society has seen drama¬
tic changes with respect to social stratification. Large por¬
tions of the middle-class and smaller portions of the lower-
1 9
class became upwardly mobile.
To conclude this discussion, the various political,
economic, and social factors have had a profound impact on the
evolution of the Saudi bureaucracy. On the one hand, the coun¬
try's economic wealth provided bureaucracy with a potentially
significant role in the overall development of the country's
natural and human resources. On the other hand, the prevailing
traditional systems of polity and society caused bureaucracy to
be irrational in its functions, less productive, and less effi¬
cient than required for that role. Nepotism, and the extremely
narrow dichotomy between political power and bureaucratic auto¬
nomy are two main examples of those traditional systems.
The objective of this study is to describe and explain the
administrative apparatus of the Saudi government by analyzing
^^Ibid., pp. 56-60.
^^Koury, The Saudi Decision-Making Body, pp. 46-54.
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the bureaucratic structure in Saudi Arabia against key varia¬
bles in Weber's model and the Sala model and their problematic
implications within the Saudi bureaucracy. Particular attention
is paid to; (1) functional deficiencies of the administrative
apparatus as indication of administrative inefficiency, and
(2) the relationship between political, economic, and social
factors and these deficiencies.
II. THE PROBLEM AND ITS SETTING
This study focuses on the continuing deficiency of the
Saudi bureaucracy. The Ministry of Finance and National Eco¬
nomy (MFNE) represents a typical agency of the Saudi public
bureaucracy.
The Agency and Its Units
Founded in 1932, the Ministry of Finance and National Eco¬
nomy is one of the oldest governmental institutions in Saudi
Arabia. Its major responsibilities can be stated briefly as
follows;
1) preparing, implementing, and controlling the annual
budget of the government
2) maintaining control over the government's revenues
and expenditures
3) maintaining control over the money supply through
the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA)
4) preparing and implementing international economic
agreements between the Saudi government and the
foreign governments and corporations.
The structure of the MFNE consists, primarily, of four dis
tinctive areas; (1) budgeting, (2) financial affairs, including
revenues and expenditures, (3) international economic relations
and (4) administrative affairs, including the personnel depart¬
ment. Figure 1 illustrates MFNE status in the overall Saudi ad





THE SAUDI COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
SOURCE: Fouad Alfarsy, Saudi Arabia: A Case Study In Development
(London: Kegan Paul International, 1982), p. 96.
FIGURE 2
MINISTRY OF FINANCE AND NATIONAL ECONOMY
SOURCE; Fouad Alfarsy, Saudi Arabia ; A Case Study in Development,
(London: Kegan Paul International, iyy2), p, 110.
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Work Experience of The Writer
The Personnel Department at MFNE has three divisions:
employment, training, and payroll. The employment division is
responsible for appointments, promotions, retirements and other
related functions. The Training Division provides the ministry
employees with information about training opportunities. The
Payroll Division prepares and arranges the process of the
monthly payments of the ministry's employees.
The writer worked in the Employment Division of the Person¬
nel Department between July, 1979, and June, 1982. His primary
tasks included:
1) Appointment procedures which included receiving
job applications, evaluating them, issuing appoint¬
ment orders, and corresponding with the Civil Ser¬
vice Bureau, a central government agency that over¬
looks the implementation of personnel related
regulations.
2) Promotion procedures which included evaluating the
various promotion applications and sending the valid
applications to the Bureau of Civil Services (BCS)
to obtain authorization to issue an administrative
order of promotion.
3) Retirement and service-time extension. Procedures
for retirement include issuing an administrative
order of retirement for the ministry employees who
are sixty years of age or more. Procedures for
service-time extension include, however, receiving
applications of the ministry employees who have
reached the retirement age, and who are willing to
stay on their jobs. Upon evaluation, these appli¬
cations, are sent to BCS for approval after
which an administrative order of service extension
is issued.
4) Annual evaluation of the job titles: The Employment
Division received applications of job-title modifi¬
cations submitted by the various departments of the
ministry. After evaluating them, these applications
were sent to BCS for approval.
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Statement of the Problem
During the three years of employment with the Personnel De¬
partment, the writer observed various organizational and social
relations within the Saudi bureaucratic environment. In parti¬
cular, the problem of a severe persisting deficiency, both
structural and functional, was observed. Such deficiency is
illustrated by the various shortcomings that characterize the
Saudi administrative system. Specifically, these shortcomings
are: overcentralization of authority, functional overlapping,
high rate of overstaffing, turnover and absenteeism, excessive
redtape, discouragement of innovation, inadequate responsiveness
to the public, low valuation of positive bureaucratic values
(e.g., rationality, neutrality, and efficiency), and the condi¬
tion of imbalanced development between bureaucratic institutions
and other major institutions of the society. In order to narrow
the scope of the problem and to make it more specified, two con¬
siderations are taken into account. First, these various short¬
comings are not looked at, in this study, as separate, indivi¬
dual cases but rather as a set of interdependent variables that
contributed, as a whole, to the overall condition of bureaucra¬
tic deficiency. Second, these shortcomings are investigated
only within the conceptual framework of the Weberian model and
the Sala model as applied to the Saudi administrative system.
The significance of that problem lies in the fact that
the Saudi bureaucracy is the primary feasible channel for
gradual changes and reform within the country's socio-political
13
system. Moreover, there are two reasons which lead to the
belief that the Saudi bureaucracy could play an indispensible
role in the socio-economic welfare of the country. First is
the powerful role of the government in the country's economic
market. Second is the continual growth of the public sector.
III. REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Weber's Bureaucratic Model
For the last few decades. Max Weber's model of bureaucracy
has been under vigorous criticism for regarding organizations
as mechanistic, stable, closed systems with much emphasis on
control and centralization of authority. More recent schools
of thought such as the Human Relations School, the Institu¬
tional School and the Open System Theory, despite their differ¬
ences, emphasize that organization systems are open, adoptive,
1
and organic. ^
Nevertheless, the bureaucratic model still attracts the at
tention of students of political science, sociology and public
administration. Kast indicated that many recent studies have
used the bureaucratic model as a point of departure, suggesting
that bureaucracy is a condition that exists along a continuum
rather than in an absolute sense, either present or absent.^^
In this sense, one would say that a feature such as a well-
defined system of authority or professionalization would exist
1 ^
See, for example, Fremont Kast and James Rosenzwigs,
Organization and Management (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co.,
1974), p. 65; Edward Page, The Political Authority and Bureau¬
cratic Power (Knoxville: The University of Alabama Press, 1985)
pp. 3-5 and Ralph Chandler and Jack Plano, The Public Adminis¬
tration Dictionary (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1982), pp. 155
156; 222-225.
^^Kast and Rosenzwig, Organization and Management, pp. 63-64
14
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at a high degree in the ideal type of bureaucracy, whereas in a
less bureaucratic organization they would be present at a small
degree. According to George Gordon,
Weber himself indicated that the model was not meant
to apply to all conceivable organizational situations,
and that it represented only a broad framework rather
than an all-encompassing model 5
Thus, Weber viewed bureaucracy as a clear-cut framework in¬
tended to construct an ideal design of organization with empha¬
sis on rationality, efficiency and control. Weber suggests that
the bureaucratic form is the most efficient instrument of com¬
plex organizations that has ever been developed. He wrote:
Experience tends universally to show that the purely
bureaucratic type of administrative organization is,
from a purely technical point of view, capable of
attaining the highest degree of efficiency and is in
this sense formally the most rational known means of
carrying out imperative control over human beings.
It is superior to any other form in precision, in
stability, in stringency of its discipline, and in
its reliability.1 6
There are six key characteristics of Weber's bureaucratic
model: (1) rational and legal system of authority, (2) division
of labor, (3) hierarchy, (4) formal network of rules and proce¬
dures, (5) maintenance of files and records, and (6) profes¬
sionalization.
Authority is the most fundamental concept in that model.
1 5
George Gordon, Public Administration In America (New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1982), p. 179.
^^ax Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization,
trans. A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New York: The Free
Press of Glenco, 1964), p. 337. Quoted in Kast and Rosenzwig,
Organization and Management, p. 63.
16
In one of his most remarkable introspections of the political
sociology, Weber recognized the principle i legitimacy as a
fundamental feature that is shared by all authoritarian enti¬
ties ^"7 Consequently, the different forms of belief in legitimacy
led Weber to identify three types of authority: charismatic,
traditional, and legal-rational authorities. Charismatic
authority is based on the followers' belief in the sacredness
or extraordinary character of their leader. Traditional author¬
ity, however, is rationalized by reference to old-established
systems of social behaviors and values. Legal-rational author¬
ity, per contra, is rooted in the "belief that a person giving
an order is acting in accordance with his duties as stipulated
in a code of legal rules and regulations."18
Although Weber's typology of authority has not been chal¬
lenged directly, writers have documented the effect of bureau¬
cratic power over democratic values. For example. Page indi¬
cated that the expertise of the civil servants, and the princi¬
ple of secrecy of information gain the bureaucrats a real in¬
fluence in the policy-making, whereas the elected political
leader, who is a non-specialist, is left with relatively little
power.19 Gordon cited individual privacy and liberty as vic¬
tims of the growing American bureaucracy with its computer
I^Felix A. Nigro and Nigro, Lloyd G., Readings in Public Ad¬
ministration (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1983), p. 163.
18
Ibxd., p. 164.




Hierarchy and division of labor are two interrelated fea¬
tures because division of labor is based on the hierarchial
structure. Hierarchy, in Weber's model, is structured clearly
and strictly with provision for authority from the higher level
to the lower level and provision for appeal from the lower level
to the higher level. Division of labor, however, means that the
different tasks are divided based upon their types and purposes,
with emphasis on clear-cut areas of jurisdiction for each unit.
While the objective of hierarchy is to maximize control, the ob¬
jective of labor division is to increase specialization, and
21 ...
eliminate functional overlapping. Much of the criticism is
directed to Weber's structure of hierarchy because it sought
maximum control. For example, the Hawthorne experiments em¬
phasized the employees' psychological needs such as mutual
support, care, teamwork, and informal agreements as the main
motivation for production rather than the economic needs implied
in Weber's theory. Furthermore, the writings of Lewin and
Likert asserted the need for democratic and participative man¬
agement in which middle-level and low-level employees take
22
part in the decision-making process. Such thoughts represent
far departures from the Weberian notion of control-oriented
bureaucracy.
20ibid., p. 178.
^^Ibid., pp. 184-186, 190.
22
Gordon, Public Administration in America, pp. 530-531.
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Another important feature of Weber's model is the formal
network of rules and procedures in order to insure stability,
predictability, and impersonality in operation, as well as, re-
23
liability in performance, which all lead to more control;
This feature led to the development of the so called bureau¬
cratic dysfunction; a term created by R. Merton to refer to
excessive rigidity, red tape, impersonal treatment of clients,
unreasonable resistance to change and other "signs of sick
24
organizations." But the most important of these dysfunctions,
according to Merton, is goal displacement, i.e.,
...the tendency of bureaucracies to adhere to rules
as ends in themselves, with bureaucratic methods and
procedures taking precedence over the objectives for
which the agency was created?^
Maintenance of files and records is another recognized fea¬
ture. This feature is designed to insure that any action taken
is both appropriate to the problem in question and consistent
26
with past actions in similar circumstancesf
Last of the key elements of the Weberian model is the con¬
cept of professionalization. Professionalization means that
appointments to positions are based solely on work-related
27
skillsT Employees work full time, are career-oriented, and
^^Ibid., p. 178.
^^Chandler and Plano, The Public Administration Dictionary,
p. 174.
^^Ibid., p. 173.
^^Gordon, Public Administration in America, p. 178.
2'7ibid.
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receive a regular salary as well as retirement pension. Thus
every employee directs his or her full energy and time to one's
28
specific job and gain more specialization as time goes by.
While contemporary views on professionalization are drawn,
basically, from the Weberian postulations mentioned above,
recent literature concentrates on new and complex issues asso¬
ciated with the growing number and power of professional groups.
Prime examples include professionals' manipulation of infor¬
mation that penetrates the personal lives and the individual
freedom of private citizens, professionals' conflict with their
political and bureaucratic leaders, as well as the constrained
relationship between professionals and the public due to the
formers' resentment of citizen participation in the decision-
making process.
To sum up, despite its relative obsoleteness and the
numerous criticisms, Weber's ideal model is still widely recog¬
nized, not only for its systematic and clear conceptual frame¬
work, but also because of its profound assumptions about ration¬
ality, efficiency and neutrality.
Bureaucracy And Its Environment
The interrelationship between the administrative system and
its environmental variables has been recognized increasingly
since the early 1960s. Nowadays, political, economic and social
Ibid.
29
Ibid., pp. 535, 569.
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factors are hardly neglected when discussing bureaucracy.
Three major theoretical approaches to the study of bureaucracy-
environment relationship are: (1) the Classical Theory, (2) the
Systems Theory, and (3) the Prismatic Society Theory.
The views of the classical theory, on this subject, is
already discussed in the previous section since Weber has been
one of the most recognized fathers of this theory. It is
appropriate, yet, to reemphasize two essential points here.
First, the Classical theory is based on the assumption that
organization is hardly affected by outside forces of the envi¬
ronment. Rather members of the organization are considered
rational individuals who are motivated by their economic needs.
Although Weber made remarkable observations about the political
basis of bureaucracy, he maintained, repeatedly, that bureau¬
cracy was only an instrument for the political leader to main¬
tain functional efficiency and control. Moreover, his view
that bureaucracy functions impersonally and neutrally reflected
•XQ
the classical ideology of political-administrative dichotomy.
The Systems Theory represents, nowadays, the most recog¬
nized paradigm (or breakthrough) regarding an organization's
interaction with its environment. Basically, the Systems Theory
assumes that organization is a system, i.e., "an organized col¬
lection of parts united by prescribed interactions and desig¬
nated for the accomplishment of a specific goal."^^ Each
^*^Chandler and Plano, The Public Administration
Dictionary, pp. 222-225.
Gordon, Public Administration in America, p. 196.
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organizational system has; (1) inputs; (demands and resources),
(2) outputs; (goods and services), and environmental feedback;
(demand for more outputs or demand for correcting output mis¬
takes). Furthermore, this theory identifies two primary systems
of organization; closed and open systems. The former seeks
"elimination of uncertainty" through maximizing stability and
predictability. The closed system is best seen as a machine
whose operation is not affected by the outside forces of the
environment. The Open System, however, seeks "anticipation of
uncertainty," and asserts the interdependence of organization
and its medium in the form of "balancing pressure and responses,
demand and resources, etc."^^ The Open System is best seen as
a biological organism. It exchanges with its environment as an
animal or a plant does.
The Prismatic Society Theory, promulgated by Fred Riggs,
emerged during the early 1960s. This theory was recognized pri¬
marily among the students of comparative administration and re¬
presents the theoretical basis for Alawaji comprehensive study
about bureaucracy in Saudi Arabia. In brief, Riggs identified
three models of societies: Agraria (or fused). Transitional (or
prismatic), and industrial (or diffracted). These models ac¬
count for the ecological processes of society. Thus, a society
which has many specified structures is called a refracted model
32ibid., p. 198. Also see Chandler and Plano, The Public
Administration Dictionary, pp. 104-106.
22
(highly industrialized societies). In comparison, a society
having single functionally diffused structures is called a
fused model (e.g., Thai Kingdom before the 19th century). A
society with features between the fused and the diffracted
models is called Prismatic (transitional societies in Asia,
Africa, and Latin America)Figure 3 illustrates the transi¬
tional model by corresponding it to a prism through which fused
light passes to emerge diffracted upon a screen. Consequently,
Riggs built submodels for the various substructures (political,
economic, etc.) for each model. He called the administrative
submodel in the prismatic society, "sala" compared to "office”
in the refracted society, and "court" or "home" in the fused
society. Finally, he indicated that the Sala submodel is
characterized by numerous administrative problems such as over¬
lapping of authorities and responsibilities, formalism (i.e.,
written rules are not applied in everyday practices), and
heterogeneity (i.e., traditional social structure and values
exist together with governmental institutions, modern gadgets,
and emerging intellectual class).^^ It should be mentioned,
however, that this model was modified significantly in a later
version, in which Riggs identified "malintegration" as a new
dimension in the prismatic society. This dimension, along
with the modified sala model, will be discussed fully, later,
^^Fred W. Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries; The











SUBMODELS: COURT/HOME SALA OFFICE
SOURCE: Fred W, Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries;
The Theory of Prifatlc Society (Boston: Houghton'Mifflin Co», 1964) t
p. 27.
♦ Adainistratire Models are added for clarification.
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under "Elaborational Analysis" as that section deals with the
applicability of the modified sala model to the Saudi bureau¬
cracy.
Apart from the bureaucracy-environment relationship,
deficiencies of bureaucracy are yet relevant to the subject
matter of this study. Bureaucratic deficiencies are quite
numerous, and increasingly as organizations get more compli¬
cated there are some of them, such as, over-centralization,
excessive formality of communication, red tape, and over-
staffing which are well-recognized and need brief discussion.
Over-centralization and excessive formality of communica¬
tion are two inherent shortcomings in the ideal bureaucracy, and
were vigorously criticized by post-Weberian theories. The cri¬
ticism was not directed to the two shortcomings per se, but
rather to their negative implications such as ignoring the em¬
ployee's psychological needs, overlooking the values of partici-
35
pative management and treating employees like machines.
Red tape is, likewise, a serious deficiency inherent in
bureaucracy. Although the word originated in the 17th-century
England referring to tying official documents with red tape, it
was not until the 19th century that the word used to refer to
excessive adherence to rules and regulations, resulting in ex¬
tended delays of actions. As indicated earlier, red tape is
related to goal displacement; a wider p; anomenon typical of
35
See Gordon, The Public Adminisrrat:on in America, pp. 184-




Overstaffing is another deficiency, and caused by factors
inside the organization, like those implied in Parkinson's Law.
This law suggested that the number of officials grows at a
fixed rate unrelated to the actual work load of the organiza¬
tion. According to Parkinson, there are two causes for such
increases. (1) An official wants to multiply subordinates, not
37
rivals. (2) Officials make work for each other. In most
developing countries, overstaffing is, often, also a result of
the government's policies of increasing the employment rate.
Although favoritism is not an inherent deficienv^'y in
bureaucracy, it emerged in various forms in many bureaucracies.
While it usually takes the form of patronage in the industrial
countries, nepotism is the typical form in the less developed
*ZQ
countries.
Bureaucracy in Saudi Arabia
The evolution of the Saudi administrative system is divided
into three stages; the foundation stage, the growth stage, and
the current stage.
The foundation stage began with the unification of the
State in 1932 and ended in 1962. This stage is characterized by





See Alawaji, "Bureaucracy and Society in Saudi Arabia,"
pp. 78-80.
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generally poor economic conditions. Consequently, the bulk of
the government revenues went for defense, and internal security.
Although ministries of education, health, and communication
emerged in the early 1950s, their revenue shares were quite low.
In general, at the end of this stage, there was an established
system of government in the form of the Council of Ministers
headed by the king who holds the position of Prime Minister as
well. There were eleven ministries, but the system of local
and regional governments was still undefined.
The growth stage took place between 1962 and 1975. The
prime feature, here, is the introduction of administrative re¬
forms introduced by the Ford Foundation Team (FFT) of the United
States. Following an agreement with the Saudi government in
1963, the FFT stayed in the country for ten years studying its
administrative system, and made various recommendations which
opened the road for many reforms. Among such reforms were the
establishment of the Department of Organization and Management
in 1964, and the High Committee for Administrative Reform, in
the same year, as well as establishment of the Institute of
Public Administration in 1972.^®
The current stage started in 1975 and continued through
the present time. This stage is characterized by comprehensive
expansion of the development programs, a natural response to the
39
See Nyrop, Saudi Arabia; A Country Study, pp. 35-47.
40
See Almazroa, "Public Administration Trends and Prospects
in The Development of Saudi Arabia," p. 188.
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booming revenues of oil of the 1970s. Not surprisingly, six
new ministries, as seen in Table 1, and forty governmental and
quasi-governmental agencies were founded between 1975 and 1980.
Despite numerous deficiencies, the economic prosperity has been
noticed in many areas, and across the different social strata.
Roads, hospitals, schools, and construction assistances have
expanded dramatically.
Similarly, the number of government employees increased
from 246,700 in 1975 to approximately 399,400 in 1980.^^ This
meant a 62 percent increase within a five-year period. By 1985,
the number of employees increased to 469,000, adding a 14.4
percent to the 1980 figure. 4-2
Beyond these stages, the Saudi bureaucracy has been a pro¬
duct of three interacting forces; (1) changing economy, (2) re¬
gional differences, and (3) social values.
While the pre-1970s period was characterized by a slow
rate of development, due to the country's low revenues from oil,
the economic conditions have changed dramatically since the mid-
1970s as indicated by the third stage period.
Regional difference is another factor that shaped the Saudi
bureaucracy. Koury noticed that until the late 1960s, the ad¬
ministrative apparatus, especially at the top level, was staffed,
dominantly, by people from the Western region. This region was
4-"I Third Development Plan, 1980-1985 (Riyadh: Ministry of
Planning, 1980), p. 37.
Fourth Development Plan, 1985-1990 (Riyadh: Ministry of
Planning, 1985), p. 66.
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TABLE 1
THE MINISTRIES IN SAUDI ARABIA
Foundation Year
The Ministry A.H.*
1. Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1349 • 1930
2. Ministry of Interior 1350 • 1932
3. Ministry of Defense and Aviation 1365 • 1945
4. Ministry of Health 1370 « 1951
5. Ministry of Communications 1372 • 1953
6. Ministry of Education 1973 « 1953
7. Ministry of Agriculture and Water 1373 • 1953
8. Ministry of Commerce 1373 « 1954
9. Ministry of Finance and National Economy 1374 • 1954
10. Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources 1380 • 1960
11. Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs 1380 • 1961
12. Ministry of Pilgrimage and Endowments 1381 • 1962
13. Ministry of Information 1382 • 1963
14. Ministry of Justice 1390 » 1970
15. Ministry of Higher Education 1395 » 1975
16. Ministry of Planning 1395 • 1975
17. Ministry of Public Works and Housing 1395 « 1975
18. Ministry of Industry and Electricity 1395 • 1975
19. Ministry of Municipals and Rural Affairs 1395 • 1975
20. Ministry of Telegraphs, Posts and Telephones 1395 • 1975
* A.H. Anno Hijra (Islamic Year)
SOURCE: Ahmad Almizajaji,"The Public Attitudes Toward
Bureaucracy," (Ph. D. dissertation, Florida State Univer¬
sity, 1982), p. 10.
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more urbanized, had more connection with the outside world and
exceeded other regions in establishing a, relatively. Western
type of education. Since the early 1970s, however, this trend
has changed as rising numbers of government employees from the
Central and the Southern regions, has been observed.4^5
Finally, social values are cited as major determinants of
the Saudi bureaucracy. Alawaji, for example, has recognized
three essential values of the country's social system; (1) col¬
lectivism, (2) fatalism, and (3) the concept of time.
Collectivism is reflected in the view that the core social
unit is the family rather than the individual. Individual in¬
terests in this society come after those of the family. This
pattern of collective relationship is the cause, according to
Alawaji, for nepotism, and corruption in the bureaucratic net¬
work.44
Unlike collectivism, which emerged from kinship ties, fata
lism is based on a combination of religious-cultural values, a
poor economy, and family ties. Fatalism resulted in the indivi
dual taking negative attitudes toward creativity and authority.
Thus, whatever one believes, he or she accepts family control,
superior authority, and transfer that pattern of obedience and
personal resignation to the work environment.^5
43Koury, The Saudi Decision-Making Body, p. 45.
^^See Nyrop, Saudi Arabia; A Country Study, pp. 76-77, and




The concept of time, among the Saudis, is related to their
fatalism. The individual is accustomed not to exceed community
expectations, and is not motivated to achieve but rather to
maintain the status quo. This attitude leads to a valuation of




The exploratory method of research was used to analyze the
subject matter of this study. According to Earl Babbie, explor¬
atory studies are most typically done for three purposes;
1) to simply satisfy the researcher's curiosity and desire
for better understanding;
2) to test the feasibility of undertaking more careful
study;
3) to develop the methods to be employed in future studies.
The exploratory method is, in general, essential whenever a re¬
searcher is breaking new ground regarding certain social phe¬
nomena, and this method almost always provides new insight into
the problem in question.48
In the case of this study, the researcher felt that the
bureaucratic problem in Saudi Arabia, is, relatively, a new
ground for research because the political, social, and econo¬
mic settings of that country have been underrepresented in
serious objective studies. Much of the existing literature
about Saudi Arabia is written by Westerners and tends to be
descriptive rather than analytical. This literature is often¬
times full of stereotypes and generalizations. Therefore, an
application of exploratory-oriented analysis is highly needed
4'7Earl Babbie, The Practice of Social Research (Belmont,





as well as appropriate.
Within the exploratory method, this study employs a nomo¬
thetic model of explanation rather than an ideographic one.
The former model is more practical because it seeks to discover
only those considerations that are most important in explaining
the problem under study rather than looking for a comprehensive
explanation.
The unit of analysis in this study is the governmental
agency in the Saudi bureaucracy. The data for analysis is de¬
rived from two sources. First, the qualitative method of par¬
ticipant observation based on the writer's experience in the
Ministry of Finance was used to investigate the problem in
question. This method is applied informally, in the sense that
upon analyzing the data, the writer's work experience is often
cited implicitly, rather than explicitly since the unit of ana¬
lysis includes the whole structure of the Saudi bureaucracy.
Nevertheless, the writer believes that his work experience is
an excellent source of data not only because it provided for an
examination and evaluation of sources of information, but it is
also the basis for making various elaborations and comments
during the analysis of data.
Secondly, a content analysis is applied by introducing and
discussing examples, statistics, and viewpoints from various
studies relevant to the subject matter, among which were four




The conceptual framework of this study is based, essen¬
tially, on two well-acknowledged theoretical models of bureau¬
cracy; the Weberian model and the Sala model. In the initial
analysis, which covers most of analysis part, Weber's model is
utilized to examine the problematic subject matter. In parti¬
cular, four key variables of that model were analyzed within
the context of the Saudi bureaucracy. These variables are:
legal-rational authority, hierarchy, division of labor, and
professionalization. As the Weberian model turns out to be
methodologically irrelevant to the Saudi administrative system,
and its distinctive settings, the modified Sala model is applied
as an alternative framework that is believed to give a more
appropriate, realistic and subtle explanation to the bureaucra¬
tic phenomenon in a transitional society. A particular emphasis
is paid to the feature of malintegration which is the key vari¬
able in the modified version of the Sala model. The other
variables of that model, such as formalism, overleaping etc.,
have already been studied in Alawaji's study mentioned earlier.
V. ANALYSIS OF DATA
Legal Authority
While the concept of authority in Weber's bureaucratic
model takes, as indicated earlier, a legal-rational form, the
system of authority in the Saudi bureaucracy can be fairly con¬
sidered to be one with a dual system of authority, in the sense
that it has a mixture of both traditional authority and legal-
rational authority.
The traditional authority can be explained by the following
manifestations: nepotism, excessive informal contacts, and over¬
centralization .
Nepotism is, undoubtedly, a widespread problem in the
public service environment. In his study, Alawaji presented a
sample of 271 Saudi bureaucrats with the following situation:
"Suppose an employee X is informed that, because of the public
interest, he will be transferred from Riyadh, the capital, to a
remote area...but he objects to the transfer. If employee X is
a friend or a cousin of a top official who could nullify the
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decision, do you expect his appeal to be accepted?"^ Seventy-
nine percent of the respondents said that the transfer would
not take place because the official would feel that he had an
obligation to his family or his friend. The large-scale pattern




of nepotism can be attributed to the particular orientations of
individuals in a society characterized by extended family struc¬
tures, with strong beliefs in tribal affiliations. Conse¬
quently, the individual in the Saudi society goes through a
socialization process which identifies particular social inter¬
ests as being more important than the public interest. For
example, the same sample was asked: "Is favoring relatives and
friends a recognized social duty?" Seventy-two percent of the
respondents answered, "Yes", while only twenty six percent
responded negatively^'' The problem of nepotism reaches a very
high magnitude in some areas of the public sector and in some
cases, the bureaucrat's concern for the public becomes extremely
low because it conflicts with his own personal interests. 52
Another facet of the traditional authority is the common
attitude toward informal contacts. In his sample, Alawaji found
that as many as 95 percent of government employees approved of
informal contact. Furthermore, when dealing with inter-depart¬
mental contacts, the positive attitude toward informality gets
as high as 82 percent. In Weber's model, the communication
process takes a very formal channel along the hierarchial lad¬
der, in order to maintain maximum control. Although the struc¬
ture of the Saudi bureaucracy is based, theoretically, on the
same assumption - like most bureaucracies in the world - the
5llbid., pp. 183, 274.
an, "Innovation in The Saudi Arabian Bureaucracy,"
p. 94.
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everyday practices deviate sharply from Weber's model. The
informal patterns of communication, either within or out of the
organizational environment, are quite common.
Excessive centralization is a good example of the dual au¬
thority in the Saudi public bureaucracy. Centralization is jus¬
tified as a way to maintain control. The typical Saudi mana¬
ger sees centralization as a high privilege which assures a
patriarchial role for him over his subordinates. Such a role
is quite consistent with the existing social norms of the lar¬
ger Saudi society. Excessive centralization is reflected by
top managers' resistance to delegating their authority. For
example, in one study of 123 senior bureaucrats, Alhegelan
asked each one in his sample, "Do you think training programs
should stress technical skills or delegation of authority?"
Among the respondents, only 17.8 percent chose delegation of
power, the rest (82.2 percent) preferred stressing technical
skills
The legal-rational side of that authority, however, becomes
apparent when there is no stimulus (so to speak) for exercising
traditional authority. For example, when three employees become
candidates for promotion on the same date and have similar ex¬
perience, the Selection Committee in the Personnel Department
would be fair and rational in its decision, provided that none




Moreover, the legal-rationality of bureaucratic authority
is seen in the relatively apparent division of labor, the im¬
personal order of command, the vertical hierarchy, and the for¬
mal channel of communication.
Beyond the previously discussed phases of the dual author¬
ity and their specific factors, two final points are quite sig¬
nificant to the issue of authority in the Saudi bureaucracy.
First, the current dual system of authority is basically rooted
in the pattern of the socio-political setting. It was indicated
earlier that the Saudi political structure is characterized by
the concentration of power, i.e., control of the legislative,
the executive, and the judicial functions rests in one body of
the government. Moreover, the elite groups have a powerful
influence on the overall system of authority.54 Consequently,
the common belief within society is that if one needs things
done quickly and efficiently, one should use personal connec¬
tion and nepotism rather than usual channels of rigid bureau¬
cracy. Figure 4 illustrates the formal status of the elite
groups as well as bureaucracy in the Saudi decision-making body.
This figure, however, overlooks the informal contacts that take
place within that body.
Second, a growing phenomenon has been taking shape fol¬
lowing the economic boom of the mid-1970s, that is, the new
middle-class. The new middle class has been emerging and
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expanding rapidly, as urbanization has swept the country espe¬
cially in the main cities of Riyadh and Jeddah. Consequently,
a growing urban lifestyle has been noticed, accompanied by de-
tribalizing patterns (e.g., adopting nuclear family structures,
and decreasing ties with the extended family). Also, there has
been a tendency among individuals toward identifying themselves
with professionals such as doctors, academicians, teachers, and
government employees .55
It is not clear what impact the growing middle-class will
have on the traditional authority that dominates the bureaucra¬
tic setting. On one hand, there is an optimistic expectation
that an increasing number of educated individuals within the
middle-class would improve the administrative efficiency of the
governmental institutions. On the other hand, the booming pri¬
vate businesses are attracting many educated people, especially
those with advanced degrees from European and American univer¬
sities. Most of the individuals who left government service
for the private sector cited more pay as the main reason for
the change. However, it is believed that these individuals
felt disappointed and frustrated by the apparent functional and
structural deficiencies of public institutions due to the lack
of a rational basis of bureaucratic authority.
Hierarchy and Division of Labor
Hierarchy in the Saudi bureaucracy takes a vertical form.
The channel of communication is very narrow from the top to the
55Koury, The Saudi Decision-Making Body, p. 47.
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bottom and vice versa. This type of hierarchy is enhanced by
the centralization of authority. Even though the hierarchial
order was intended to maintain control over the employees'
behavior, the informal channels of communication are quite
widespread as has been mentioned earlier.
Another serious problem connected with the hierarchial
structure in the Saudi bureaucratic system is its discourage¬
ment of innovation. The principle of centralization established
in the hierarchy system has created the (so-called) one way
channel of communication in which orders and directives flow
from the top to the bottom. With this type of organizational
structure, it is difficult to establish a participative admini¬
stration. Consequently, the members of the middle- and lower-
levels have the perception - justifiably so - that any initia¬
tive on their part would not be seriously acknowledged. And
even if it were considered, their reward would go to someone
else, such as one's supervisor. Another dysfunctional by-pro¬
duct of this type of hierarchy is the ever growing problem of
red tape, which has been noticed typically in every administra¬
tive levelIn fact, red tape is a part of the broader pheno¬
menon of goal displacement which has been explained earlier.
This phenomenon can be identified easily in the typical behav¬
ioral patterns of the Saudi bureaucrats.
Although formal channels of communication are dominant,
^^Alhegelan, "Innovation in The Saudi Arabian Bureaucracy,"
p. 92.
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other forms of communication exist. For example, lateral com-
57
munication, in which employees in different divisions communi
cate formally (through written memos) or, more frequently, in¬
formally (by phone, conversation), without attention to the
hierarchial structure is prominent. Also, some type of feed¬
back mechanism takes place, i.e., "transmitting information
from those who originally received messages to those who sent
them. "58 in the Saudi bureaucratic environment, the feedback
mechanism usually takes the form of personal conversation with
the supervisor. The problem with these two channels is that
they are quite limited, both in scope and in magnitude.
The division of labor in Saudi bureaucracy is a principle
that, in practice, has been hindered by many factors. Three
prime examples are (1) lack of adequate organizational manuals,
(2) overlapping of responsibility, and (3) overstaffing.
Most public organizations in Saudi Arabia seriously lack
adequate operational manuals. In one study, only 46 percent of
the sample of Saudi government employees cited that they had
organizational manuals, and more than half of these said that
5Q
their manuals were few in number and ineffective.*'^^
A foreign observer of the Saudi administrative structure
has indicated;




Gordon, Public Administration in America, p. 211.
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organization, there is a universal lack of clearly
defined lines of responsibility and accountability.®*^
Naturally, because of the absence of clear-cut areas of respon¬
sibilities, some functional overlaps will occur. For example,
at the local government level two types of administration with
parallel functions exist. One type is the institution of local
government such as the Government House. Another type is the
local branch of the Central government, such as the Police De¬
partment. Usually, both the Governor and the Head of the Police
Department have high, yet specified responsibilities regarding
the public safety resulting in an overlapping of authority.
Overstaffing is a relevant problem because, in the ab¬
sence of explicit areas of responsibility for the different
units, it becomes difficult for top management to maintain
recruitment policies based on the actual needs of the organi¬
zation and other forces determine these policies. For instance,
overstaffing can occur, sometimes, as a result of interorgani-
zational conflicts such as when top officials try to enhance
their power by increasing their subordinate staffs regardless
of the current personnel needs of their units. This writer
noticed that some divisions in the Ministry of Finance have a
span control of 12 to 15 employees under the direction of one
supervisor. This situation results in inefficient supervision
and low productivity rate.
. E. Warner, Proposed Accounting Development Program For




Despite the fact that current writers are more interested
in areas like professional-administrative conflict and profes¬
sionals' manipulation of information, their views on the deter¬
minant dimensions of professionalization are based, mostly, on
the Weberian assumptions.
As mentioned earlier, Weber regarded bureaucracy as a way
of establishing a lifelong career for its members. Members of
the bureaucracy are recruited on the basis of their qualifica¬
tions and each performs a specific type of work to which he or
she devotes one's total energy and lifetime. Organization mem¬
bers advance from the bottom of the organization's hierarchy to
the top, and they identify themselves with the organization and
its way of life.
In the Saudi bureaucracy, the situation is quite different.
It is true that there are many individuals who have spent their
lives working for the government, but these individuals stay in
the government, usually as a matter of convenience since there
are few job opportunities outside the public sector. Basic pro¬
fessional values such as a work ethic and a sense of accountabi¬
lity to the public are rare in the value system of the typical
Saudi government employee. Instead, government work is regarded
as an easy way to secure a living. To illustrate, Alhegelan made
a study about the Saudi senior bureaucrats and found that 52 per¬
cent of his sample had general apathy for their jobs.^"' In
61Alhegelan, "Innovation in The Saudi Arabian Bureaucracy,"
p. 56.
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addition, absenteeism and low productivity per employee are
commonplace and the subject of public complaints and political
cartoons. Alawaji found that the majority of government em-
ployees spend half of their time in non-work-related activities
In general, there are four points that illustrate that
Saudi bureaucracy is below recognized standards of modern pro¬
fessionalization. First, although the public sector is still
the main employer, it has a high rate of turnover particularly
during the last decade. This is largely due to growing role of
the private sector in attracting many government employees.
According to official statistics, 6,516 new government employees
were hired in 1977. In the same year, however, 6338 left their
jobs for different reasons, but the majority (61 percent or
3,866) resigned from government positions to work for the boom¬
ing private businesses.
Second, the typical government employee in Saudi Arabia
has a vague sense of identification with his job. It is seldom
regarded as a career in the Weberian sense (that is, the focus
of one's energy and life). This situation can be attributed,
in part, to the absence of professional organizations which are
forbidden by the government. Also, the overall realization
among employees of inefficiency and irrationality in bureaucra¬
tic management is another contributing factor.
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Alawaji, "Bureaucracy and Society in Saudi Arabia,"
pp. 223-224.
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Almazroa, "Public Administration Trends and Prospects in
The Development of Saudi Arabia," p. 94.
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Furthermore, the substandard level of professionalization
is rooted in the fact that most public employees lack sufficient
training to perform their jobs adequately. Although the Insti¬
tute of Public Administration has conscientiously worked to
provide government employees with various training programs,
its limited budget seriously restricts the scope of its efforts
and makes it difficult to offer the necessary training to many
public employees.
However, there is some recognition of professionalization,
which can be traced along two lines. One is the latent con¬
flict between the religious and governmental institutions and
other institutions. For example, religious colleges and the
Ministry of Justice have constrained attitudes toward the poli¬
cies of the Institute of Public Administration (IPA) concerning
its program of providing graduate studies in commercial and
international law. Such programs are considered, by the former
establishments, to be contrary to Sharia religious law.
On the other hand, there is a shared feeling of profes¬
sional identity among IPA's former students because of the
secular, legal knowledge they have acquired outside of the pre¬
vailing religious law. The other line is tense, uneasy atti¬
tude that exists between the ministries and the newly esta¬
blished government agencies. Part of this tension is attri¬
buted to the fact that these governmental agencies have been
given some autonomy in exercising their authority, particularly
their personnel system which is not overlooked by the Bureau of
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Civil Services. Ministry employees think that such privileges
should be granted to them likewise.
Thirdly, low professionalization is reflected in the poor
attitude which public employees have toward the public. Weber's
concept of professionalization implies that a bureaucrat would
provide the public clientele with free, efficient and equally
based services. The condition in the Saudi bureaucracy is
vastly different. This is not surprising in an environment
characterized by nepotism on all levels of bureaucracy. In one
study about the public's attitude toward bureaucracy in Saudi
Arabia, the author found that about eighty-five percent of his
sample believed that administrators lacked concern for the
64
public. Seventy one percent thought civil servants did not
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treat people fairly, and about half of the sample felt that
the government employees displayed a low degree of civic respon¬
sibility (i.e., an unwillingness to cooperate or follow the
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formal rules). Briefly, bureaucrats' treatment of the public
is determined by changing situational factors (e.g., the per¬
sonal attitude and mood of the employee, who is receiving the
service, when, and how).
Finally, the low esteem of professionalization is caused
by the usual practices of the personnel system. The Saudi






personnel system tends, increasingly, to be based on merit
principles and task-oriented values. For example, the person¬
nel system encourages competent employees to advance in the
hierarchy by providing them with promotion tests after serving
two years in their current grades. Usually, every employee is
promoted automatically, after staying four years on his or her
current grade. Another example of applying the merit system
is reflected by the increasing recognition of job-related
qualifications and performance on the job. Yet, the common
application of the merit principles is typically irrational
and based, again, on situational and personal variables.
This writer, for example, noticed during his work experience
that some departments apply for job-title modifications, not
in response to the actual need for consistency, precision, and
efficiency, but rather to have job titles well-suited to the
upcoming promotion of favored employees. As a result, the
process of position classification, oftentimes, does not re¬
flect merit-based criteria.
Elaborational Analysis;
The Weberian model of bureaucracy has been highly recog¬
nized because it is based on a theoretically profound assump¬
tion, and has a clear-cut systematic framework. When applied
to the subject matter of this study, Weber's model did, un¬
doubtedly clarify, to some extent, some of the deficiencies
within the Saudi administrative system. Yet, there is a seri¬
ous methodological problem regarding the applicability of that
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model to the Saudi bureaucracy. There are two points to
illustrate this argument.
First, Weber assumed, basically, that bureaucracy is
highly rationalized structure in which values of economic
efficiency, neutrality, and predictability shape the world view
of the organization in particular, and that of whole social
structure in general. The capatalistic Western societies
represent, so far, the closest types to have that world view.
Consequently, it is no surprise that the main features of
Weber's model, from legal-rational authority to high
professionalization are best found in West European
bureaucracies especially in France and Germany whose political
and historical factors have created highly complicated and
large structures of bureaucracy with powerful impact on the
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whole social system. '
Second, whenever Weber's model is used to examine the
bureaucratic phenomenon in a developing country, it fell short
in bringing about a relevant, thorough, and realistic
explanation of the structural and functional problems in
question. For instance, deficiencies like nepotism, excessive
centralization, and informal contact are all regarded, by Weber,
as merely irrational forms of authority. Such a viewpoint does
not take into account the peculiar internal dynamic that takes
place within the transitional society.
^"^For a full discussion of this subject, see Ferrel Heady,
Public Administration; A Comparative Perspective (New York:
Marcel Dekker Inc., 1979) p. 170-194.
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Since early 1960, other models, more applicable to the
developing societies, have been introduced. A prime example of
these models is Riggs' "Prismatic Society Model."
This model has been discussed earlier since it was the concep¬
tual basis for Alawaji's study. It is important, however, to
reexamine, this model in its late version which implied notice¬
able differences from the old one. It is appropriate, first of
all, to discuss, briefly, the sociological assumptions on which
Riggs built his model. These assumptions are represented by
Talcot Parsons' structural-functional approach. In short.
Parsons indicated that traditional societies are ascriptive,
particularistic, and diffuse; "ascriptive" means that social
status is based on birth or inherited roles. "Particularistic"
suggested that major decisions about social policy are based on
the interests of special group(s) within the social strata.
"Diffuse" implies that social structures of less developed
societies lack functional specificity (or specialization).
Developed societies, per contra, "tend to be achievement-
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oriented, universalistic, and specific."
As indicated earlier, Riggs identified three models reflec¬
ting the ecology of societies. These models are: fused, prism¬
atic, and diffracted. In a later version, however, Riggs iden¬
tified a new dimension by suggesting that each model is either




possession of, or lack of coordination among the various
elements of the social structure. As a result, the modified
model has two fundamental changes from the old one: first, the
prismatic model would reflect not only semi-differentiated
societies, but also differentiated societies (such as
industrial societies) that are malintegrated. In contrast,
diffracted model would refer to societies which might have low
differentiation (i.e. low degree of specialization and
division of labor) but have high degree of integration.
Second, transitional societies of the Third World would be
classified, under the modified model, as semi-differentiated
but malintegrated societies, or as Riggs labeled them, "ortho-
prismatic." While he kept his typology of the administrative
submodels (i.e. chamber, sala, and bureau) unchanged, Riggs
mentioned two significant implications within the Sala model in
the modified version, as follows:
a) Bureaucratic power has a weak scope. This means that
the value system inherited in bureaucracy including recognition
of specialization, rationality, and efficiency, etc. is hard to
incorporate within the traditional cultural norms of the ortho-
prismatic society. However, the weight of bureaucratic power
(i.e. degree of participation in the decision-making process)
is heavier in an orthoprismatic setting than the case would be
in a fused or a diffracted society. The reason is that bureau¬
cratic structure in a transitional society is growing at a rate
exceeding the development of its political institutions since
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the values of power-sharing, democratic representation, and the
like are still underestimated concepts in the political culture
of the prismatic societies. Consequently, under such condi¬
tions of imbalance between political and bureaucratic develop¬
ment, and given the vague borders between the legislative, the
executive, and the judicial branches, the bureaucrats are
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tempted to fill the power vacuum in the political process.
b) The heavy weight of bureaucratic power makes administra¬
tive efficiency quite low in the orthoprismatic model vis a vis
the case in the other models. In other words, the accomplish¬
ments of the administrative structure are too little when
compared with their overall costs This condition is caused
by the absense of clear, agreed-upon goals and detailed and
operational objectives. Also, this condition is caused by the
persisting state of "vacuum of power" and the vague areas of
jurisdiction as indicated above. Although the deficiencies of
the Sala model, (such as nepotism, formalism, institutional
corruption, etc.) all remained unchanged in the modified Sala
model, they are to be seen from a new, more complicated
perspective.
How is the case of the Saudi bureaucracy to be reexamined
under the orthoprismatic model, and, more importantly, would
this model be applicable here? The first part of the question




Data suggested that the Saudi bureaucratic system is quite
malintegrated. For example, the various literature, as dis¬
cussed earlier, showed that the size of the Saudi bureaucracy
had grown substantially, particularly since the mid-1970s.
Development on other levels, however, remained static. Not
only the system of political culture, remain paternalistic, but
also the educational system have been full of marginal curricu-
lums and traditional methods of teaching, all led to an imba¬
lance in the development process.
Apart from the imbalanced development, the range of values,
implied in bureaucracy, such as specialization, rationality,
etc., are almost always not recognized in the Saudi Society.
The examples brought up by Alawaji regarding nepotism and func¬
tional overlapping (as mentioned in pages 34 and 42,) represent
a good illustration of this point.
The remaining features of the Sala model (i.e. hetero¬
geneity, overlapping, and formalism) are examined fully in
Alawaji's study which concluded, incidentally, that the Saudi
bureaucracy bears high similarity to the Sala model. It is
beyond the scope of this study to reexamine these features.
Besides, since these three features did not change in Riggs
modified model, the reader might refer to Alawaji's work which
this writer came to find as profound as well as satifying.
Still, there are two points about overlapping and formalism
worth brief discussion:
1) Riggs' model has been subject to much criticism
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regarding its validity, as well as testability. For example,
R.K. Arora has argued that the prismatic model has ethnic
Western bias, and that its features are far from being value-
freed.It is believed that such criticism is highly valid.
To illustrate, Riggs identified nepotism as a deficiency
inherited in the orthoprismatic society and a direct result of
"overlapping." However, according to earlier data in this
study, many Saudi individuals regarded nepotism as a social
duty (see page 35). Moreover, nepotism is actually considered,
in many instances as an advantage rather than a deficiency
because in a society characterized by particularistic values,
rigid bureaucracy, and lack of participative decision-making,
nepotism serves as a practical solution to accomplish the
particularistic interests of individuals. In short, nepotism
is undesirable and irrational, sometimes, but not at all times
or at most of the times.
2) Like nepotism, formalism has been questioned by critics
of Riggs. E. Valsam and R. Milne, for instance, claimed that
formalism in a prismatic society might be desirable or not de-
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pending upon circumstantial factors. In the context of the
Saudi bureaucracy, this viewpoint tends to be quite valid.
This writer has noticed many situations in which formalistic




work characterized by excessive red tape, functional over¬
lapping and obscure areas of jurisdiction. Table 2 provides a
summary about the applicability of the modified Sala model to
the structure of the Saudi bureaucracy.
Beyond these deficiencies, it is quite necessary to refer
to the phenomenon of "Soft State" as indicated by Gunnar Myrdal
in his book; The Challenge of World Poverty. According to
Myrdal, almost all underdeveloped countries have governmental
systems characterized by a condition of Soft State, i.e. a
loose system of social discipline in the form of
deficiencies in legislation and in particular law
observance and enforcement, a widespread disobedi¬
ence by public officials on various levels to rules
and directives handed down to them, and often their
collusion with powerful persons (...) whose conduct
they should regulate.74
Also, implied in that term is an overall state of debase.
Myrdal analyzed this phenomenon throughly within the context of
South Asian countries, particularly India and Pakistan, with
emphasis on the role of the polihistorical factors during the
Colonial era, in contributing to the growth of "Soft State."
Despite the sociopolitical and historical differences between
Saudi Arabia and those countries, the former is not an excep¬
tion from the rest of Third World countries with regard to the
condition of "Soft State." For example, particularistic social
values and paternalism in which "people became accustomed to
being ordered about but also by getting away with as much as
74Gunner Myrdal, The Challenge of World Poverty (New York:
Vintage Books, 1971), p. 208.
TABLE 2
APPLICABILITY OF SALA MODEL TO THE SAUDI BUREAUCRACY
SALA MODEL (Modified)
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they could do,""^ are well recognized attitudes in the Saudi
social system. More importantly, this system lacks a strong
social discipline which is attributed to the paternalistic
attitudes as well as to the relative economic well-being of the
post-1975 era. The later is exemplified by the "euphoria of
plenty" syndrome. According to E. Nekhlah:
Because of the abundant oil revenues, state-
subsidized social services, and the many oppor¬
tunities available to Saudi nationals with even a
minimum education, many Saudies no longer perceive
any urgent needs for advanced training on their part.
This new ethic of plenty means to many Saudies that
■ ’ ■ ’ ' ’ ' ' ’ ■ sile defense system
In addition, the condition of "Soft State" in Saudi Arabia
is manifested by the existing lack of sufficient number of
competent employees in the bureaucracy; a situation caused by
euphoria of plenty, the society traditional culture which look
down at mechanical job and training, as well as the few oppor¬
tunities for training. Finally, the Saudi administrative sys¬
tem, like all "Soft State" systems has a problem of overstaff¬
ing as well as serious lack of rational delegation of author¬
ity, which both have been discussed under "analysis of data."
Ibid., p. 212.
Emile Nekhleh, The United States and Saudi Arabia; A
Policy Analysis (Washington, D.C.; American Enterprise
Institute for Public Policy Research, 1975) p. 18.
VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This study was intended to explain and examine some
structural and functional problems that plagued the bureaucratic
structure of Saudi Arabia. Analysis of this problem took two
stages.
In the first stage, the Weberian classical model of
bureaucracy was used. In particular, four major variables of
that model have been analyzed within the context of the Saudi
bureaucratic environment, with emphasis on the problematic
aspects of the subject matter. These variables were: legal
authority, hierarchy, division of labor, and professionalization
By analyzing the data, at that stage, it is found that the
Saudi bureaucracy has a dual system of authority. Ingrained in
such system are serious problems of nepotism, informal contact
and excessive centralization. The principles of hierarchy and
division of labor were, likewise, faced with various functional
deficiencies. Lack of innovation, overlapping and overstaffing
have been the primary facets of these deficiencies. In
addition, professionalization, in the Weberian sense, is
hindered by numerous obstacles such as high turnover rates, low
profile of professional orientation, lack of technical skills
and constrained relations between government employees and the
general public.
The second stage consisted of a brief elaborational
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analysis, which has been a necessary process in order to over¬
come the methodological limitations of the Weberian model. The
modified Sala model is introduced, here, as an alternative
model more appropriate to the unit of analysis under study.
By applying this model, it is found that the Saudi bureaucracy
is characterized by an overall low valuation of bureaucratic
values such as rationality and neutrality. More importantly,
the development of the government administrative institution
is, in fact, imbalanced by the continuing low rate of develop¬
ment of other principal institutions of the society.
Recommendations
The question arises as to how to solve the problem of
deficiency in the Saudi administrative system. The answer, in
fact, is multifarious; deficiencies like nepotism and tradi¬
tional patterns of authority would take some time to change
since these two deficiencies are directly linked with long-
rooted values of the social system. Beyond that, it is quite
relevant to present Myrdal's views of this subject. According
to Myrdal:
there is little hope [...] for rapid development
without greater social discipline, which will not
disappear without legislation and regulations en¬
forced by compulsion. [Less developed countries]
have in general placed many fewer obligations much
less effectively upon their people than have Western
countries. The dictum of the conservative American
jurist Learnd Hand that "law is violence" would not
appeal to or be understood by, [the Third World]
intellectual elites.
77 Myrdal, The Challenge of World Poverty, p. 216.
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Other shortcomings such as overcentralization, excessive
red tape, absenteeism, and low productivity can be eliminated
by expanding the IPA's programs. So far, the IPA has provided
the government employees with wide variety of training programs
ranging from managerial programs, for the various levels, to
computer programs, accounting, and law studies. While the IPA
has expanded by having two more branches in Jeddah and Dammam,
there are so many governmental employees who cannot register in
these programs, either because of mobility problems (for those
outside the three cities in which the IPA branches are located),
or because their employer departments would not let them go for
various reasons. But whatever these reasons are, it is essen¬
tial that the IPA's programs reach as many employees as possi¬
ble. To achieve this goal, a quota system should be developed,
in which each department is required to send a certain percent¬
age of its workers to attend those programs. In addition, cri¬
teria should be developed to select those workers who are most
suitable to benefit from training, as well as to avoid irra¬
tional selection. Moreover, the current IPA branches should
increase the variety of their programs to approximate those
offered at its headquarters in Riyadh.
Besides, it is quite important to develop the current
administrative system of check and control. For example, the
Bureau of Civil Service (BCS) is the main check-point for
almost all personnel-related actions. Also, it is the legal
interpreter of the personnel regulations. Yet, its
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interpretations are, often, arbitrary, and done on a case-by¬
case basis. While the BCS has been undertaking serious efforts
to issue more details about its regulations, the need for
systematic, consistent and thorough regulations is still there.
The constrained relations between the public employees and
general public is a very serious problem. A practical solution
would be, for example, to assign inspectional missions to areas
where there are complaints about the level of public services.
In the long run, however, studies and experiments should be
conducted to examine the feasibility of sensitivity training
sessions and other psychological methods to improve the tense
relations not only between the public employees and the general
public, but also the human relations inside the organizations.
Some of the Saudi universities have already the academic capa¬
bilities to conduct such studies.
Finally, the development of the administrative system is
quite impossible without reevaluating and renewing the educa¬
tional system in order to match the strategic goals of the
national development as promulgated in the Development Plans
which have been discussed, along with their goals, at the in¬
troduction of this paper. For instance, there should be fur¬
ther expansion of technical and commercial education at the
high school level as well as at the college level. In addition,
the current policy of providing educational opportunities to
thousands of students to study abroad is an effective policy.
However, as the governmental and quasi-governmental structures
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are growing rapidly, there is, in parallel, an increasing need
to expand these opportunities.
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